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Proponents of 'intrinsic rule ordering have offered a hypo-
thesis known as Proper Inclusion Precedence as a universal con-
straint on rule application.. Koutsoudas, Sanders, and Noll 1974 
state Proper Inclusion Precedence as follows (8-9)1 
l) Proper Inclusion Precedence 
'For any representation R which meets the structural 
description of each of two rules A and B, A takes 
applicational precedence over B if the structural 
description of A properly includes the structural 
description of B. •· 
'The structural description of a rule B is PROPER-
LY INCLUDED in the structural description of a rule 
A if and only if the structural description of B 
can be placed upon the structural description of A 
with some part of the structural description of A 
left' over •. •· 
Koutsoudas, Sanders, and Noll (hereafter KSN) illustrate the 
predictions of the princ-iple with an interaction involving two 
Latin American Spanish rules, restated here in terms of feature 
specifications. 
2) Final Deoalatalization (FD) Palatal laterals are 
depalatalized word-finally. 
[+ lat, - cor] # 
0-[+ ant, + cor, - hi] 
J) Delateralization (D) 
alized everywhere. 
[ + lat, - cor] - u L - voe, - cons, - lat] 
l# 
"' l 
Palatal laterals are delater-
The representation ake'i 'that' meets the structural description 
of each of the two rules. Since the SD of Final DepalataUza-
tlon, [+ lat, - cor] # 0 properly includes that of Delaterallza-
tion, [+lat, - corj, Proner Inclusion Precedence predlcts--
correctly--that Final Depalatalization takes appl1cat1onal pre-
cedence over Delaterallzation, as in 4a)o This prevents the in-
correct order of application shown in 4b). 
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4) a) /a.kel/ 'that' b) /akd/ 
akel FD akej D 
D (bled) FD (bled) 
[akel] *[akeJ] 
The only explanation that has been offered for Proper In-
clusion Precedence (hereafter PIP) ls the observation that the 
more general of a pair of rules in a proper inclusion relation-
ship cannot possibly apply so as to block application or the 
more restricted rulee The structural description of the more 
restricted rule in a pr9perinclusion relationship does not 
qualify the more restricted rule to apuly to any representations 
other than those to which the more general rule is also quali-
fied to apply, Therefore, if the more general rule did apply so 
a.s to block application of the more restricted rule,. the more re=. 
stricted rule would fall to apply anywhere and could not conse-
quently be considered a rule of tho grammar,. Since the more re-
stricted rule in a pro~er inclusion relationship 1& indeed a 
rule of the grammar if it is stated at all, it therefore follows 
that the application or such a rule must take precedence over a 
potentially bleeding application of the more general rule in the 
relationship. 
A distinction between the 'potential domain' of a rule and 
the 'actual domain' or a rule will facilitate discussion of pro-
per inclusion relationships between the structural descriptions 
or rules. The 'potential: domain (of application) of a rule' le 
the set of objects referred to by the rule 0 s structural descrip-
tion. The 'actual domain {of application) of a rule' ls not de-
termined solely by the structural description of tho rule, since 
in a rule ordering framework, there ls a possibility of a rule's 
being bled or counterfed, so that it falls to apply to some re-
presentations that match lte structural description. The 'ac-
tual domain (of application) or a rule' in a rule ordering 
framework, then, ls the set of representations which match the 
rule's structural description, minus the representations to 
which its application ls prevented by the bleeding or counter-
feeding applications of other rules. 
The Latin American Spanish rules can be used to illustrate 
the distinction between the notions 'potential domain' and 'ac-
tual domain' •. The potential domains of the two rules are those 
shown in 5), on the following page. The actual domain of appli-
cation of Final Depalatalization is[+ lat, + cor] #--identical 
to its potential domain, since no ap~lications of Final Depala-
talization are bled or counterfed by applications of another 
rule. On the other hand, the actual domain of anplicatlon of 
Delateralization is something like 'V (+ lat, - corJ V and 
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#[+lat, - co;-/,•· since this is what is left over after Final 
Depalatalizatfon bleeds Delateralization. Although the poten-
tial domains of the two rules are in the inclusion relationship 
shown in 5), the actual domains are complementary, as shown in 
6). 
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5) Inclusion Relationship of P~tentlal Dornains of Latin 
American ~nish Rules 
6) Comple~ent Relationship of Actual Domains of Latin 
American Spanish Rules 
·----.. 
----j-----Actual Domain of 
Delateralization 




Beyond the distinction between the two types of domains, 
the Latin American Spanish situation illustrates, more impor-
tantly, how the predictions of Proper Inclusion Precedence fol-
low from the explanation that rules have to auply somewhere. 
Since the potential domain of application of Delaterallzation 
includes the potential domain of Final Depalatalization, as shown 
in 5), and since application of Delateralization before Final 
Depalatalization would bleed application of the latter, as shown 
in 4b), it follows that Delateralization applied before Final 
Depalatalization would 'absolutely bleed' the application of 
Final Depalatalizatlon. That is, prior application of Delater-
alization would effectively remove every object in the poten-
tial domain of Final Depalatalization. There would then be no-
thing left to which Final Depalatalization could apply. But Fi-
nal Depalatalization, being a rule of the grammar of Latin Amer-
ican Spanish, must apnly to something. It therefore follows 
that, to avoid being absolutely bled, Final Depalataiization 
must take anpllcational precedence over Delateralization, as .Pl!' 
correctly predicts. 
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The explanation that a rule has to apply somewhere would 
seem to be very satisfactory motivation for the predictions of 
PIP. However 0 the formulation and the predictions of Proper In-
clusion Precedence are not~ in fact, entirely consistent with 
this explanatlono By not allowing for the fact that applica-
tlonal precedence of the more general rule in a proper inclusion 
relationship would not necessarily entail bleeding of the more 
restricted rule in that relationship, PIP overstates a linguis-
tically significant generalizationo This generalization is the 
fact that among the 'more restricted1 rules in proper inclusion 
relationships, it is nrecisely the rules which are notentially 
bled by their 'more general 'c·ount•rparts that must take appli-
cational precedence in order to exist. 
The overstatement of PIP can be illustrated with a pair of 
rules originally presented in Mal&cot 1960 and discussed later 
in Chomsky 1964. Some varieties of American English have the 
rule ?a), which nasalizes a vowel before a nasal consonant, and 
the rule 7b), which deletes a nasal consonant that is both pre-
ceded by a lax vowel and followed by an unvoiced stop. 
7) a) Vowel Nasalization (VN) 
V [a, + nasJ e.g •. hand (hinclJ 
candor ( klinJ dor 
amble (~ m]ble ~ 
[+ nasJ 
b) Nasal Deletion (ND) e. g. [kit] can't 
[- ~n~ t ~as] [ son, - cont J camp [kip] - del rel, 
Jj, - vce hint [hit] 
JI 
(Chomskyr 96, Malecots 22-9) 
Since the potential domain of Vowel Nasaliz~tlon, V [c, + 
nas], properly includes that of Nasal Deletion, (V, - tnsJ ( c, 
+ nas] [-son, - cont, - del rel, - vce], it follows that if 
Vowel Hasalization took applicational precedence such that it 
bled Nasal Deletion, it would then bleed all possible applica-
tions of Nasal Deletion. There is no danger of this, however, 
since Vowel Nasalization ls ~ potentially bleeding with res-
pect to Nasal Deletion. That is, µrior ap~lication of Vowel 
Nasalization could not possibly diminish the input to Nasal De-
12tion. For example, both /k~mp/, underlying form for camp, and 
~~P• the result of applying Vowel Nasalization to the underly-
ing form, match the structural description of Nasal Deletion. 
Therefore, Nasal Deletion would not have to apply before Vowel 
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Nasalization to preserve its existence. It could still be a rule 
of the grammar if it were to apply after Vm1el Nasalization--
which lt in fact does, contrary to the prediction of Proner In-
clusion Precedence•· 
Since the structural description of Nasal Deletion properly 
includes that· of Vowel Nasalization and since both SD's are met 
by a representation such as /k~mp/, Proper Inclusion Precedence 
incorrectly predicts that Nasal Deletion taJces precedence over 
Vowel Nasalization in applying to such forms. This incorrect 
prediction is shown in Ba), with the correct prediction in 8b). 
8) a) /kaemp/ camp b) /kremp/ 
,.J 
ktep ND k~p VN 
VN k~p ND 
[k~p] 
By overstating the generalization appropriate to the interaction 
of rules in a proper inclusion relationship, PIP incorporates the 
false prediction of Ba). Another example of a false prediction 
stemming from the overstatement follows. 
Kenstowlcz and Kisseberth (1979• 193-6) consider two rules 
of Klamath, borrowing data from Barker 196J. A rule of vowel 
harmony changes the vowel of the causative prefix ene- to the 
vowel of the following verb stem. And a rule of vowel elision 
deletes the first vowel of the virb stem to which the prefix is 
attached, if the vowel is short. 
9) a) Vowel Harmony {VH) 
s n v]CAUSATIVE + 0o v]VERB STEM 
1 2 J 
:=}1 2 §. 
4 5 6 
4 5 6 
e. g. g_~ 'is· tired• 
sne-ge15ig-a 'makes tired• 
qdo1~-a 'it rains' 
---sno-qdosc-a 'makes it rain' 
m'a1s~is sick' 
sna-m'ass7-a 'maJces it sick' 
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9) b) Elision (E) 
s n v] CAUSATIVE + Co r:. v ] 1 
l: long .l VERB STEM 
l 2 J 
1 2 J 





sne-wt-a 'makes laugh' 
Since the structural descriptions of both Vowel Harmony and Eli-
sion are met by the underlying form /sne + nqot'-a/ 'scorches 
something• (cf. nqot 0 ~a 'scorches'), and since the structural 
dP.scrintlon of Ellslon ::iroperly includes that of Vowel Harmony, 
Proper Inclusion Precedence makes the counter-to-fact prediction 
shown in 10a) 0 by which Elision takes applicatlonal precedence 
over Vowel Harmonye. The correct aoplication of the rules ls 
shown in lOb). 
10) a) /sne + nqot'-a/ b) /sne + nqot'-a/ 
sne + nqt'-a E sno + nqot•·-a VH 
------------ VH sno + nqt'-a E 
*[snenqt' a] (snonqt•a] 
The counterexamples might be discredited by arguing that 
the rules involved have not been stated correctlye What this ap-
proach involves ls finding different formulations of the rules, 
for which Pro~er Inclusion Precedence ls not applicable 0 and as-
serting that since the new formulations, rather than the counter-
exemplifying statements, are the only correct statements of the 
rules, the alleged counterexamnles really do not falsify PIP at 
all. For examule, the 'more restricted' rule in the falsifying 
English examnle could be restated as in 11), adding the specifi-
cation(+ nas] to the initial position of the SD. 
11) Nasal Deletion, restated 
[ V, - tns, + na~ [c, + nas] [ ::~:· -cont, -del re~ 
~ 
Since a vowel is, after all, nasalized before a nasal stop by 
the other American English rule, this restatement of Nasal Dele-
tion ls as observationally adequate as the earlier statement of 
Nasal Deletion. The structural descrintion of Nasal Deletion, 
restated, still properly includes that- of Vowel Nasalization, 
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but it is no longer tho case that the SD's of both rules are 
matched by underlying representations such as /k;JZmp/. Since 
now only the SD of Vowel Nasalization ls met by this form, PIP 
no longer incorrectly predicts that Nasal Deletion must ~re­
cede Vowel Nasalization in applying to the forms. By the same 
policy of restatement, the Klamath counterexample could also be 
dismissed. 
Thus, a rule-writing policy which required these counter-
examples to be stated in a form to which PIP is inapplicable, 
would save the hyoothesis. However, any such policy would ex-
clude every conceivable counterexample to PIP, as the following 
considerations will show. In any pair of rules, the rules must 
be related in one or more of the ways shown in 12), 
12) Possible Relationships of Rules 
a) Feeding 
b) Counterfeeding 
c) Mutually non-affecting 
d) Bleeding 
e) Counterbleeding 
Consider the possibilities of any of these relationships 
coinciding with a proper inclusion relationship in a way that 
is relevant to the predictions of PIP. 
13) Observations 
a) No rules in a feeding relationship with res-
pect to some representation R are in a proper 
inclusion relationship with respect to the re-
presentation R, since by the definition of 
'feeding,' the structural description of one of 
the two rules in such a feeding relationship is 
not matched by R. 
b) Similarly, no rules in a counterfeedlng rela-
tionship with respect to some representation R 
are in a ~roper inclusion relationship with 
respect to that representation, since by the 
definition of 'oounterfeedlng,' the structural 
description of one of the rules in such a rela-
tionship is not matched by R. 
c) No rules in a ~utually non-affecting relation-
ship with resnect to some reuresentation R are 
relevant to PIP, since in such cases, applica-
tional precedence of one rule is empirically 
indistinguishable from applicational precedence 
of the other. 
d) i) The more general rule in a ~roper inclusion 
relationship with respect to some renresen-
tation R could not nossibly bleed the more 
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restricted rule so as to falsify PIP, since 
that would exclude the more restricted rule 
from the grammar, contrary to the fact of 
its existence. 
11) It is conceivable (and demonstrable, as with 
the Latin American Spanish example) that the 
more restricted rule in a pro~er inclusion 
relationship with respect to eome represen-
tation R, could bleed the more general rule 
--which would corroborate PIP. 
e) 1) It ls conceivable (and demonstrable, as with 
the Latin American Spanish example) that the 
more general rule in a proper inclusion rela-
t lons hl p with respect to some representation 
R, could counterblecd the more restricted 
rule, which would also corroborate PIP. 
ii) Finally, it ls conceivable (and demonstrable, 
as with the American English example) that 
the more restricted rule in a proper lnclu-
s ion relationship with respect to some re-
presentation R, could counterbleed the more 
general rule, which would falsif;r, PIP. 
The uosslbllitles a-e, though not mutually exclualve,are 
exhaustive. Only the last case, l)e 11)--which includes my 
counlerexamples--nermlts fals1f1cat1on of PIP. Feodlng and 
counterfeedlng relationships never coincide with proper inclu-
sion relnHonshl'r:m, mutually non ... affecting relationships are ir-
relevant to PIP, bleeding relationships can only corroborate 
rather than falsify PIP (cf. lJd), and counterbleedlng rela.-
tlonship:J in which the more general rule of a proper inclusion 
relationship counterbleeda can only corroborate PIP. Therefore, 
any conceivable counterexample to PIP must have tho same form as 
my counteroxam~les1 there must be two rules in a proper inclu-
sion relationship with respect to some representation R such 
th:it the more general rule 1s counterbled by the more restricted 
rule. It follows that any rule-writing policy which excludes 
my counterexamples will exclude any conceivable counterexamples 
to Proner Inclusion Precedence. 
Given the above conclusion, the status of Koutsoud~s, San-
ders,and Noll's hypothesis ls contingent on the rule-writing po-
licy which they adopt.. One of the situations described in 14) 
must obtain. 
14) a) Koutsoudas, Sanders, and Noll have no consis-
tent rule-writing policy. 
b) The rule-writing policy which KSN assume ex-
cludes counterexamples to PIP. 
c) The rule-writing policy which KSN assume per-
mits counterexamples to PIP. 
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If 14a)_..!!!..J_he c~, KSN' s claim !~_mystical, rather ~~'}_ 
scientific. If i4ay-is the case, then it is not clear, in prin-
ciple, how-PIP could be falsified or even whether it could be 
falsified. Any conceivable counterexamples to PIP may be writ-
ton in a form to which PIP ls inapplicable by adding informa-
tion to the structural description of the more restricted rule 
of the counterexample, as was demonstrated with the American 
English exam~le. (Compare 7b) with 11).) Since a theory with no 
consistent rule-writing policy does not make it clear whether 
such information ls to be added for any particular pair of po-
tentially falsifying rules, it is impossible to tell whether or 
not the theory allows counterexamples to PIP. Given such a 
theory, then, PIP can only be regarded as a mystical, rather 
than a scientific hypothesis. 
If 14b) is the case-~if KSN assume a rule-writing policy 
which excludes counterexamoles--then PIP is true, but is not an 
~lrical hyuothesis. If the rule-writing policy adopted per-
mits no counterexamples, then PIP ls a necessary truth trlvlally 
deducible from the rule-writing policy. It makes little sense, 
in this case, to speak of 'falsifying' PIP, since the rule-writ-
ing policy guarantees that PIP is not falsifiable. If KSN in 
fact assume a rule~wrlting policy which excludes counterexam~les 
to PIP, then this fact should be made public, so that knowledr,e 
of the non-em~irical, 'necessary truth' status of PIP will fore-
stall any confused talk of falsification. 
Before considering the case 14c), a look, in general, at 
rule-writing policies designed to make particular claims true, 
may be suggestive about the desirability of 14b). Though an 
'exclusive' rule-writing pollcy has the advantage of making PIP 
true, it would seem ultimately to be undesirable. Even absurd, 
counterintuitive hynotheses such as 'Only nasalization rules are 
ble~ding rnles.' could be made true by adopting n suitable rule-
writing policy. A policy could be adopted, for example, such 
that the ~otential domain of any rule which might, on some ana-
lysis, be bled by a non-nasalization rule, was restricted to the 
rule's actual domain. This would effectively do away with any 
non-nasalization bleeding rules, since a rule with a structural 
descri~tlon that describes no m0re than its actual domain cannot 
be bled, given the definitions of 'bleed' and 'actual domain.' 
Consider, for example, the rules in 15), which, as written, 
must anply in the ordP.r shown in 16a), rather than as in 16b), to 
achieve observational adequacy.. · 
15) 11) G lat, - co~J# 
-lJ,, - . 
[ + ant, + cor, - h~ 
b) ~ lat, - cor] 
~ 
voe, - cons, - lat~ l-
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10) a) /aktl/ b) /akel/ 
akel l.5a) akej 15b) 
l.5b) (bled) 15a) (bled) 
[akeJ • GkejJ 
Th0 potential domain of l.5b) ls [+ lat, -cor]. Since l.5b) is 
bled, on the above observationally adequate analysis, by 15a), 
the actual domain of l.5b) is '[+ lat, + corJ except (+ lat, + 
cor] #.' Because 15a), on the above analysis, ls a bleeding non-
nasalization rule, the ntle writing policy under discussion re-
riulres 15b) to be restated as 17), such that the potential do ... 
main is identical to the actual doMain. 
17) [+ lat, + co:J [+ segJ 
~ 
[ = ~~~· - cons] 
The required rule 17) ls not bled by l.Sa)t ntle 17) interacts 
corrnctly with 15a) on either order of apnlicatlon,as shown in 
18). 









Thus, the rule-writing policy guarantees thnt particular rules 
will not refute the claim that only nasalization rules are 
bleeding rules •. By stating any conceivable counterexamples in a 
form to which the claim at issue ls inapplicable, a rule-writing 
policy such as this makes the claim at issue necessarily true. 
No rule arrnllcation principles which have been serioualy 
uroposed are as absurd as the one just considered.. However, 
p.:iven the multiplicity of rule apnlication hypotheses advanced 
in recent years, it seems doubtful that the quality of making a 
particular rule apulicatlon hynothesis true can be regarded as 
sufficient justification for a rule-writing policy. 
If 14£2. is the case, PIP is obviously false, as shown by 
the English and Klamath examples. There ls good reason to be-
lieve that II.le) ls indeed the case. Clearly, KSN consider PIP 
to be an empirical hypothesis, since Koutsoudas 1980, for exam-
ple, suggests how Proper Inclusion Precedence could be falsi-
fied (p. 23). If PIP is an empirical hynothesis, then the rule-
writing policy which KSN assume permits conceivable counterexam-
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nles. Consequently, the nolicy must permit the rule statements 
r.if 7) and 9) •· It follows necessarllyp then 0 that PIP ls falsi-
fied by the English and Klamath rules in?) and 9). 
To sunmarize, it was argued that the American English and 
~lamath examoles nresented here must stand as counterexamples to 
Proper Inclusion Precedence, since the rule-writing oollcy of 
1(outsoudas, Sanders, and Noll--as nearly as it can be determined 
·-permits the rules to be stated in their counterexemplifying 
forms. It was pointed out that the absence of a consistent rule-
H:ritlng policy would make the claim of Pil' vague to the ;>olnt of 
mysticism, since in the•absence of a consistent rule-writing po-
licy, it would be impossible to determine how or even whether 
PIP could be falsifiedo Further, it was pointed out that PIP 
t~ould be made true merely by suecifying a suitable rule-writing 
policy, though the justification for such a policy might be 
questionable. 
It is entirely possible that I have misconsttued KSN's in-
tentions, in which case I point to tho lack of an expliclt rule-
·writing policy as the source of my erroro. If, in fact, contrary 
to the impression given by talk of falsifying PIP, KSN assume a 
rule-writing policy which guarantees the truth of PIP, they 
should make their policy explicit enough to prevent confusion 
about the possibility of falsifying PIP. 
In conclunion, two of the observations which have been made 
here can be generalized to other IUle application hy?otheses1 
i) For those rule application hypotheses, the truth of which is 
contingent on the choice of analysis in particular cases, it ls 
imnossible to ascertain how or even whether such hypotheses 
could be falsified {or corroborated) without a clearly stated, 
consistent rule-writing policy. ii) A rule-writing policy which 
excludes counterexamples to a particular hypothesis disqualifies 
that hypothesis from status as an empirical hypothesis. Conse-
quently, the policy should be made as explicit as possible to 
avoid confusion about the possibility of falsifying the hypothe-
sis. 
NOfES 
1 I follow Barker in giving the underlyins form of the caus-
ative nrefix as /sne-/. Kenstowicz and Kisseberth do not present 
the two rules in generative formalisms1 the rule formulations 9a) 
and 9b) are my o~n. Transformational format is used to avoid any 
confusion as to whether Vowel Harmony and Elision partici~ate in 
a proper inclusion relationshiu. Note that if the structural 
description of VoNel Harmony w~re given as snv]CAUSATIVE + 
C0 V i1 VF.RB STEM' the nroner inclusion relationship of the SD' s of 
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